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Available online 15 February 2016Background and aims:We examine the relationship between individual differences and cognitive development
in order to address the question of whether variability in each might be due to common mechanisms. In two
experiments, we compare the cognitive proﬁles of groups of younger and older children matched on overall
mental age (MA) using standard tests of intelligence (British Abilities Scales-II; BAS-II, andWechsler Intelligence
Scale for Children, 3rd edition; WISC-III).
Results: In both experiments, MANOVAs revealed few differences in the proﬁles of younger and older MA-
matched children. In Experiment 1, no reliable differences were found on the six BAS-II core scales, and only
one group difference was found on the supplementary, Speed of Processing diagnostic test, where the older
children outperformed the younger children. In Experiment 2, analyses of the 10 core scales of the WISC-III
revealed two group differences. These were on Coding, where the younger children's performance was superior
to the older children, and on Arithmetic, where the older children outperformed the younger children.
Conclusions: The degree of similarity between cognitive proﬁles of younger and older MA-matched groups sug-
gests that a common mechanism may indeed underlie variability in individual differences and development.
The ﬁndings further suggest that children of different ages, who are of the same overall ability level, are at the
same developmental and intellectual level. However, further research is needed to determine just how similar
ability-matched children remain over the course of development.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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Abilities1. Introduction
Is beingmore intelligent like havingmore development? Or, are the
two things different? If one took a group of children, varying in chrono-
logical ages but matched on overall mental age, would they be found to
be equivalent in their thinking? Or, would, for example, the younger
children show advantages over the older children on some tests, and
the older children show advantages over the younger children on
other tests of abilities? These questions have relevance both at practical
(e.g., educational) and theoretical levels. However, in part because they
have been studied separately, intelligence and cognitive development
have been conceptualized as separate forms of cognitive variability,-062-23-2721, and a joint grant
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. This is an open access article underwith separate causal accounts of their underlying mechanisms. Within
intelligence research, the emphasis has long been on quantifying the
abilities of large numbers of individuals of the same age (here, the
term psychometrics is often used). The focus of this approach is primar-
ily on measuring within-age individual variability. By contrast, the ﬁeld
of cognitive development has focused on attempting to understand
the processes underlying age-related changes in ability. That is, the cen-
tral interest within this approach is explaining how variability emerges
between-ages for the average child.
While descriptions of various candidate mechanisms have been
offered at both the brain level (see e.g., Andreasen et al., 1993; Deary
& Caryl, 1997; Geake & Hansen, 2005; Haier, Jung, Yeo, Head, & Alkire,
2004; Mabbott, Noseworthy, Bouffet, Laughlin, & Rockel, 2006;
Posthuma et al., 2002; Szameitat, Schubert, Muller, & von Cramon,
2002) and the genetic level (see e.g., Plomin, DeFries, & McClearn,
2008; Posthuma & de Geus, 2006), it is the convergence of these
descriptions at the cognitive level thatmotivates the current study. Addi-
tionally, given the divergence in paths taken to the study of intelligence
and development, it is noteworthy thatwithin their separate literatures,
theoretical accounts bear several similarities with regard to thethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Spitz's comparisons of Merrill's (1924) younger more able (CA = 5.5 years) and
older less able (CA = 11.9 years) groups of children, on sub-tests of the Stanford–Binet
(Binet, 1916) test. Groups were matched on a MA of 8.0 years. Bars on the left hand-side
represent the sub-tests on which the younger group was superior to the older group
(p b .05, chi square). Bars on the right-hand side represent sub-tests on which the older
group was superior to the younger group (p b .05, chi square). On the y-axis, the
categories VII, VIII and IX refer to the age-level tasks were originally intended (i.e., 7, 8
and 9 year olds, respectively). See text for explanations of sub-tests.
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level, within the literature on intelligence, one can ﬁnd causal accounts
for single mechanisms such as speed of processing (e.g. Anderson, 1992,
1998, Burns, Nettelbeck, & Cooper, 1999, Jensen, 1993, Nettelbeck, 1987,
Wright et al., 2001), inhibition (e.g., Dempster, 1991), capacity (see
e.g., Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Jensen, 1998) and complexity
(Halford, 1999). Similarly, within the literature on cognitive develop-
ment, one can also ﬁnd descriptions of speed of processing (e.g. Hale,
1990, Kail, 1996, Nettelbeck, 1987,Wellman &Gelman, 1992), inhibition
(Houdé, 2000), capacity (e.g., Jensen, 1998) and complexity (Halford,
1999). This raises the question of whether, for example, the speed of
processing mechanism referred to within the literature on intelligence
is the same mechanism that has been described in the literature on
development. If so, differences in intelligence and differences in cognitive
development may be explained by variability on a single dimension —
a proposal Davis and Anderson referred to as the ‘uni-dimensional
hypothesis’ (see Davis & Anderson, 1999, 2001).
It is also timely to address the question of the relationship between
intelligence and development for practical reasons. For example, there
has been growing interest within the educational setting concerning
plans to adopt strategies to teach children in classes based on ability
and not age (Ong, Allison, & Haladyna, 2000; Paton, 2008; Tomlinson,
2012; Ungoed-Thomas, 2005). This involves that curricula be designed
so that in each of the core subjects (i.e., English, mathematics, science
and history) classes are taught to children of a variety of ages, but who
share similar overall levels of cognitive ability. Thus, within the ‘ability
not age’ approach, one might ﬁnd, at primary school level for example,
classes of 6-year-olds through to 10-year-olds being taught together.
Proponents of the view that younger, more able and older, less able
children are equivalent in their learning needs might be expected to
argue that intelligence and cognitive development constitute variation
on the same dimension. However, empirical support for this view is
lacking. Indeed, it directly contradicts one crucial piece of foundational
research carried out by Merrill (1924); later reviewed by Spitz (1982)
in which a mental age (MA) matching design was used to examine
the abilities of children of different chronological ages (CA). Using the
Stanford–Binet test (Binet, 1916), Merrill showed that groups of youn-
ger, more able children and older, less able children arrived at their
overall similar level of ability via different strengths and weaknesses on
the variety of sub-tests comprising the Stanford–Binet. We present
these ﬁndings shortly. However, the key point is that if differences in
intelligence and cognitive development are caused by variability to a
single common mechanism, then we might expect there to be no dif-
ferences in the performance proﬁles of the two groups on any of the
sub-tests: age differences would be compensated for by intelligence in
the younger group, and differences in intelligencewould be compensat-
ed for by age in the older group. Fig. 1 presents a comparison between
Merrill's younger (n = 15, mean CA = 5.5 years) and older (n = 54,
mean CA = 11.9 years) groups, on 11 sub-tests within the Stanford–
Binet (Binet, 1916). The two groups were matched on an overall mean
mental age of 8.0 years. On the y-axis, tasks are divided according to
the age-level for which they were intended (i.e., the categories VII, VIII
and IX contain the tests typically suited for 7, 8 and 9 year olds, respec-
tively). On the x-axis, bars represent reliable differences in percentage
points between younger and older children on a given task (i.e., the
performance score for one group, subtracted from the performance
score of the other group). Bars to the left of zero represent the tasks
where the younger childrenwere reliably better than the older children
and, conversely, bars to the right of zero represent the tasks where the
older were reliably better than the younger group. The ﬁgure shows
that the younger children reliably outperformed the older children on
six sub-tests. These were: (1) Comprehension (showing knowledge of
appropriate behavior in various social situations); (2) Similarities
(explaining the relationship and similarities between two objects);
(3) Superior Deﬁnitions (providing deﬁnitions of words); (4) Rhymes
(ﬁnding as many words as possible within one minute that rhymewith a given word); (5) 60 words (recalling as many words as possible
in 3 min from a list of 60 items); and (6)Weights (ordering objects of
the same size but different weights in ascending order). Fig. 1 also
shows ﬁve tasks in which the older children were reliably better than
the younger children. These were: (1) Fingers (without counting, the
child tells the experimenter how many ﬁngers he/she has on one, then
both hands together); (2) Counting Backwards (the child counts back-
wards from 20 to 0 in 40 s, making no more than one error); (3) Change
(how much change should be expected from a given purchase);
(4) 3words (using threewords provided by the experimenter to produce
a sentence); and, (5) Date (knowing and correctly stating the date).
While both groups exhibited the same overall MA, Fig. 1 shows
different proﬁles of abilities in the younger and older groups. From
this data, Spitz (1982) concluded that younger, more able children
would be more likely to excel on tasks involving verbal reasoning and
abstraction while older, less able children would excel at tasks tapping
experience, maturation and rote learning. On the basis of this, Spitz
argued that it is inaccurate to characterize the two groups as being
of the same developmental, or the same cognitive level. This point is
critical as it suggests that intelligence and development contribute dif-
ferentially to ability and thus are not variations on the same dimension.
To our knowledge, Merrill's ﬁndings have not since been replicated.
However, there are several advantages in replicating that design. Firstly,
using modern tests of intelligence, it should be possible to obtain more
accurate ability proﬁles of the younger and older groups of children.
Secondly, by reducing the range of chronological ages in our groups,
wemay bemore conﬁdent that any differenceswe observe, relate to dif-
ferences between children who fall within the normal range of abilities
(as opposed to differences between typically developing and atypically
developing children). This point is especially relevant when studying
lower ability children because, as the gap between their chronological
age and mental age increases, so too does the likelihood that some
form of learning, or developmental disorder, underlies their poorer per-
formance. Given that the younger and older groups in Merrill's study
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of whether both groups were indeed typically developing.1 Third, the
targeted study of the cognitive proﬁles of younger more able and
older less able children offers relevance to current calls to reform educa-
tional practices. Speciﬁcally, if it were the case that younger and older
children, who are matched on overall ability, exhibit very different
cognitive strengths and weaknesses, then this would suggest the need
to reconsider proposals for the multi-age classroom, as a common
teaching practice. Finally, the question of the extent to which younger
and older mental age-matched children are similar in their cognitive
abilities is highly pertinent to current theoretical debates. For example,
while some theorists have proposed intelligence and development are
separable (e.g., Anderson, 1992, 1999, 2001), there has also been an im-
plicit convergence in the characterization of the cognitive mechanisms
proposed to explain each type of cognitive variation.
In this paper, we outline a study in which we adopt a mental age-
matching design to examine the performance proﬁles of groups of
younger and older children who fall within the normal range of ability.
Within two separate experiments, we analyze the proﬁles of these
groups within one British sample (Year 2 vs. Year 5) and within one
Western Australian sample (Year 2 vs. Year 4), using the sub-tests of
the British Abilities Scales 2nd edition (Elliot, Smith, & McCulloch,
1997) and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 3rd edition
(WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991), respectively. In both experiments, our key
objective was to determine whether, once groups were matched on
overall mental ability, there were reliable differences similar to those
found by Merrill, in their proﬁles on the individual sub-tests.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Following parental and child consent, recruitmentwas carried out in
two ways. In Experiment 1 we adopted the selective sampling strategy
used by Merrill, in which children were recruited on the basis of
teacher's assessments. That is, we tested only those younger children
whom teachers ranked among the top 5 in their class, and, for the
older age group, those children whom the teachers ranked among the
bottom 5 in their class. In Experiment 2, we used a subset of data from
a broader research program that was not focused only on the examina-
tion of abilities of children matched on MA. Thus, in Experiment 2 we
did not impose selective sampling, and tests were administered to all
children within the target age groups. Children who were classiﬁed
with special educational needs (SEN) were not included in any testing.
For each experiment, we ﬁrst provide key descriptive statistics of the
full sample that were tested, before detailing the sample characteristics
of the reduced data set of MA matched children.
In Experiment 1, the selective sampling resulted in the recruitment
and testing of a total of 40 primary school children. This sample com-
prised 20 children (7 males, 13 females) in the younger age group
(range: 6.0–6.8 years), and 20 children (11 males and 9 females) in
the older age group (range: 10.0–10.8 years). In Experiment 2, testing
was carried out on 231 children (106 males, 125 females). However,
a number of cases were removed due to incomplete data leaving 207
in total. In the younger and older groups this comprised 104 children
(50 males, 54 females; range: 6.6–7.5 years), and 103 children (46
males and 57 females; range: 8.5–9.8 years), respectively.
2.2. Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of the test items and all associated peripher-
al materials (i.e., test booklets, stopwatch, pencils and paper), from1 Using the old-fashioned formula that IQ =MA / CA × 100, this corresponds to group
mean IQs of 145.5 and 67.2.(i) the ‘School Age’ version of the British Ability Scales II (BAS-II; Elliot
et al., 1997), designed for use with children aged 6.0–17.9 years, and
(ii) the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991), designed for children aged 6.0–
16.0 years.
2.3. Design
The study adopted a quasi-experimental, mixed design. The
between-groups factor was ability, yoked to age. The groups were
younger, higher-ability (YHA) children and older lower-ability (OLA)
children. The dependent variables were measures of performance on
each of the sub-tests within the BAS-II (Elliot et al., 1997), and the
WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991). Speciﬁcally, we converted raw scores on
each test to a ‘proportion correct’ score (i.e., a proportion of the total
score possible for a given test), thereby allowing for comparisons across
each of the subtests and between the two versions of intelligence tests.
2.4. Procedure
2.4.1. Experiment 1
All participants were tested individually on each of the BAS II Core
Scales and Diagnostic tests (Elliot et al., 1997). The full set of items
administered from the BAS II Core Scales were (1) Word Deﬁnitions
(providing verbal deﬁnitions forwords); (2) Verbal Similarities (demon-
strating how three words are related to each other); (3) Matrices
(completing an array of abstract shapes by choosing the missing shape
from a number of candidate shapes); (4)Quantitative Reasoning (choos-
ing a card showing a number of dots, that completes a pattern in a
sequence of other cards also showing a number of dots); (5) Recall of
Design (given 5 s to look at a geometric line-drawing and reproducing
it as accurately as possible); and (6) Pattern Construction (manually
manipulating patterned blocks in order to match a picture showing
the same blocks in a speciﬁc orientation). As per the standard instruc-
tions in the BAS II, the Core Scales were used to derive measures of
MA. For each child, we computed full-scale IQ scores using their scores
on the Core Scales. MA scores were created by dividing IQ scores
by 100 and multiplying this by CA (in months). In addition, the
following supplementary tests from the BAS II Diagnostic tasks were
administered: (1) Recall of Objects — Immediate (given timed exposure
to an A4 card showing 20 colored pictures of objects, once removed
from view, children must immediately recall, in any order, as many
items as possible); (2) Recall of Objects — Delayed (without a repeated
exposure to the stimulus card, after an interval of around 15–20 min,
the child is tested again on their recall for the 20 objects); 3) Recall of
Objects — Spatial (children are given an empty grid and 20 tiles, each
showing one of the colored objects. They must place as many of the
tiles as they can, in their correct position in the grid); (4) Speed of
Processing (scanning, as quickly and as accurately as possible, lines of
numbers on a page and manually crossing out the highest number in
each line); (5) Digits Forward (children are read a sequence of numbers
at a rate of 2 per second and asked to repeat them in the same order.
Sequences start out short, e.g., 2 digits and, with correct responses, get
increasingly longer to a maximum of 9 digits); and (6) Digits Backward
(children are required to repeat in reverse order a sequence of numbers
that are read aloud at a rate of 2 per second. Sequences are initially
shorter, e.g., 2 digits, and with correct responses become progressively
longer to a maximum of 7 digits).
2.4.2. Experiment 2
From the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991) a total of 10 sub-tests were
administered individually to all participants. The sub-tests used to
measure verbal abilities (scales used to compute verbal IQ scores)
were: (1) Information (oral responses are given to general knowledge
questions); (2) Similarities (children are orally presented with two
words and asked to explain how the words are similar); (3) Arithmetic
(timed response to orally presented mental arithmetic problems);
Fig. 2. Experiment 1: (a) Mean CAs and MAs in full sample of younger and older primary school groups. (Error bars show standard errors of the mean. Double stars represent signiﬁcant
differences at the .001 level.) (b) The actual MA–CA disparities in younger and older primary school groups. Data to the left of the dashed black vertical line (at point 0) represent children
with MAs lower than their CAs. Data to the right represent children with MAs higher than their CAs.
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(participants respond orally to a series of questions that require solu-
tions to everyday problems, or understanding of social conventions).
The sub-tests used to compute performance ability (used to compute
performance IQ) were: (1) Picture Completion (identifying missing
parts of pictures); (2) Coding (children copy symbols that are paired
with simple geometric shapes using a key); (3) Picture Arrangement
(ordering a set of mixed picture cards presented in a comic-strip format
so that the pictures tell a logical story); (4) Block Design (manipulating
3-dimensional blocks to replicate a2-dimensional design); and, (5)Object
Assembly (assembling the pieces of a series of puzzles that depict com-
mon objects within a given time limit). For each child,MAwas computed
using their full-scale IQ scores (using their verbal and performance IQ
scores) dividing this by 100, and multiplying by their chronological age
(in months).
In Experiment 1, and where instructions stipulated start items for
the age of children, all children started at items suited for 6 year olds.
This was because in Experiment 1, where selective sampling was
used, all younger children were expected to be of greater ability,
and all older children of lower ability. In Experiment 2, where no
selective sampling strategy was used, and thus where there were
no prior expectations concerning the abilities of younger or older
children, test items started at the level speciﬁed for the ages of chil-
dren tested.
Within Experiments 1 and 2, the number of sessions each child
took to complete the standardized tests varied between 2 and 3 ses-
sions, each lasting approximately 30–45 min. The total time taken
to complete the standardized tests was approximately 90 min.
Within these sessions, the order of the tests remained ﬁxed, with
participants completing tasks in the order they appeared in the test
booklet.
3. Results
3.1. Experiment 1
3.1.1. Full sample
In the full sample, data were complete on all BAS II Core scale
measures with the exception of one case, in the older children group,
where scores for Verbal Similarities were missing. These data were
computed using the mean of their scores on the other ﬁve Core scales.
For two other cases, data were missing on three or more of theDiagnostic measures. These data were not replaced, and were omitted
from the analyses. The overall CAs and MAs for the younger and older
groups are presented in Fig. 2a. The difference of 47 months in CA be-
tween the younger and older groups was reliable (F(1,39) = 2850.65,
p b .001, η2 = .99). However, Fig. 2 also shows that the method of
using teacher and school assessments to recruit groups of younger
more able and older less able children was not completely reliable.
Had the selective sampling been reliable, Fig. 2b would show MA–CA
differences in the younger group all above zero, andMA–CA differences
in the older children group all below zero. Instead, Fig. 2b shows some of
the younger children obtained overall ability scores that were average,
or below average for their age, and that some of the older children
obtained overall ability scores that were average, or above average
for their age. A one-way ANOVA conﬁrmed the MA difference of
20.1months between theMAs of younger and older groups to be signif-
icant (F(1,39) = 14.77, p b .001, η2 = .280).3.1.2. MA matching
To compare the performance proﬁles of exactly matched groups, we
create a subset of the data, where younger children exhibit MA greater
than their CA and where older children exhibit MA lesser than their
CA. This permits a categorical group comparison between younger and
older children more evenly matched on MA. Given the ages we tested
6–10 years old, we aimed to achieve matched groups where there
would be an overall average MA of 8, and thus where the magnitude
of differences between MA and CA in both groups would be approxi-
mately equal. The process of obtaining MA matched groups involved
testing equal positive and negative cut-offs around MA–CA = 0, that
allowed the greatest number of children to be retained in each group,
while keeping MA stable. Selecting younger children with MA–CA
differences greater than 7.5 months and older children with MA–CA
differences more negative than−7.5 yielded the largest sample in the
reduced dataset. The reduced dataset comprised 14 younger and 14
older children. Fig. 3a & b presents the mean CAs and MAs, and the
differences between MA and CAs in these groups, in the reduced set.
Fig. 3b now shows a clearer division between younger and older groups.
A univariate ANOVA showed the mean difference of 47.3 months
between the groups' CAs was highly reliable (F(1,27) = 2319.30,
p b .001, η2 = .99), while the mean difference of 4 months in their MA
was not (F(1,27) = 1.02, p= .321, η2 = .04). These groups can thus be
more clearly deﬁned as younger higher ability (YHA) and older lower
Fig. 3. Experiment 1: (a) Mean CAs andMAs for reduced set of primary school children. (Error bars show standard errors of themean. Double stars represent signiﬁcant differences at the
.001 level) (b) Mean MA–CA disparities of younger and older groups in reduced set of primary school children. Data to the left of the dashed vertical line (at point 0) represent children
with MAs lower than their CA. Data to the right represent children with MAs higher than their CA.
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YHA = 125, and OLA = 81.2
The mean proportion correct on each of the six Core Scales is
presented in Fig. 4. A MANOVA performed on these data showed
no group differences in overall proﬁles between YHA and OLA
(F(1,26) = .69, p= .415).
On the supplementary Diagnostic subtests included in the BAS-II,
highly similar proﬁles between YHA and OLAwere found again. Fig. 5
shows the mean proportion correct across these six tests for the YHA
and OLA groups. A MANOVA performed on these data however
revealed an overall main effect of Group (F(1,25) = 7.40, p = .012,
η2 = .228). Fig. 5 indicates this effect was primarily due to the large
between-group differences on one sub-test, Speed of Processing.
The univariate results of the MANOVA indicated that the YHA and
OLA differed on two tasks, Object Immediate and Speed of Processing;
with the OLA group performing better in each case (Object Immediate:
50.6 vs. 39.6; Speed of Processing: 46.8 vs. 25.6). Only Speed of Process-
ing survived a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Object
Immediate uncorrected: F(1,25) = 4.07, p = .05, η2 = .140; Speed of
Processing uncorrected: (F(1,25) = 38.64, p b .001, η2 = .607). As with
the Core scales, no test indicated reliably superior performance of the
YHA group.3.2. Experiment 2
3.2.1. Full sample
Within the full sample tested, data were complete for 207 of the 232
children. Missing data were not replaced and these cases were omitted
from the analysis. Fig. 6a shows themeanMA and CAs for the groups of
younger (N=104; 50males, 54 females) and older (N=103; 46males,
57 females) children. Due to the fact that no selective sampling was
used, Fig. 6b shows a wider distribution of abilities in both groups.
Prior to selecting a subset of childrenmore closelymatched onMA, uni-
variate ANOVAs conﬁrmed that the differences observed were reliable,
in both the CAs (F(1,205) = 2953.83, p b .001, η2 = .93), and the MAs
(F(1,205) = 193.69, p b .001, η2 = .48) of younger and older children.2 YHA IQ = 96.5 / 77.1 × 100 = 125.1. OLA IQ= 100.5 / 124.4 × 100 = 80.7.3.2.2. MA matching
MA matched groups were obtained by testing equal positive and
negative cut-offs aroundMA–CA= 0, that allowed the greatest number
of children to be retained in each group, while keeping MA stable.
Selecting just those younger children for whom MA–CA differences
were positive and greater than 3.5 months and older children for
whom MA–CA differences were more negative than −3.5 months,
and around a mean MA of 8.5 (±1 sd) yielded the largest a subset of
39 younger children (20 males, 19 females; mean age = 7.2 years,
se = 0.04) and 22 older children (12 males, 10 females; mean age =
9.1 years, se = 0.05), matched on a mean MA of 8.4 years (se = 0.07).
A univariate ANOVA showed the mean difference of 22.8 months be-
tween the groups' CAs was highly reliable (F(1,59) = 676.84, p b .001,
η2 = .920), while the mean difference of 1 month in their MA was not
(F(1,59)= 0.566, p= .455, η2 = .009). Once again, these groups more
clearly form the YHA and OLA groups. Fig. 7a depicts the CAs and MAs
for the YHA and OLA groups. The computed mean IQ of these groups
were: YHA= 115, and OLA = 92.3
AMANOVA on the proportion correct for the 10 core scales revealed
reliable differences in performance between YHA and OLA on only two
of the sub-tests: Coding (F(1,59)= 16.35, p b .001, η2= .22); and, Arith-
metic (F(1,52) = 11.58, p= .001, η2 = .16). These differences survived
Bonferroni corrections formultiple comparisons (p [0.05 / 10]= 0.005).
Fig. 8 gives the proﬁles of performance on the WISC-III core scales for
YHAandOLA groups. The ﬁgure shows YHAoutperformingOLAon Cod-
ing (70.3 vs. 55.9) and the OLA outperforming YHA on Arithmetic (47.8,
vs. 44.1).
Using a different standardized test of intelligence within a different
sample, Experiment 2 yields results that appear largely similar to the re-
sults of Experiment 1. In both experiments we failed to replicate the
ﬁndings of Spitz (1982), who reported reliable differences in the respec-
tive proﬁles of groups matched on an MA of 8.0 years. The results from
the current study indicate that younger and older ability matched chil-
dren exhibit broadly similar proﬁles of performance on the sub-tests.
4. Discussion
On the basis of Merrill's earlier work, Spitz argued that MA-matched
children of different chronological ages do not possess similar skills or3 YHA IQ = 101.7 / 88.2 × 100 = 115.3; OLA IQ = 100.7 / 109.8 × 100 = 91.7.
Fig. 4. Experiment 1: Mean proportion correct on the six BAS-II Core Scales for MA-
matched YHA and OLA primary school groups. See text for explanations of sub-tests.
(Error bars show standard errors of the mean.)
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different strengths and weaknesses. In replicating Merrill's original de-
sign, we found a very different set of results, using two standardized
tests of intelligence. Our MA-matched groups of YHA and OLA children
differed reliably on only 3 out of 22 sub-tests that we administered.
Experiment 1 found no instances where the YHA reliably outperformed
the OLA, and only one instance where the OLA reliably outperformed
the YHA. In contrast to Spitz's ﬁndings whereby the YHA had an advan-
tage on tasks tapping verbal abilities (e.g., Comprehension, Similarities,
Superior deﬁnitions, Rhymes, and 60words), we did not ﬁnd, for exam-
ple, the YHA group to outperform the OLA on Word Deﬁnitions or
Verbal Similarities. Similarly, where Spitz previously found the OLA to
have advantage on tasks tapping experience (e.g., Fingers, Counting
backwards, Change, 3 words and Date), we might have expected
the OLA in our study to have the advantage on tasks such as Recall of
Designs and Pattern Construction. This was not the case, and the kinds
of differential patterns of strengths and weaknesses that Spitz showed
were not revealed.
In Experiment 1, the YHA and OLA groups were not statistically
distinguishable in their performances on the Core Scales, and there
was little difference between the YHA and the OLA on the Diagnostic
tests. Only one reliable difference emerged between groups. This wasFig. 5. Experiment 1: Mean proportion correct on the six BAS-II Diagnostic tests for MA-
matched YHA and OLA primary school groups. See text for explanations of sub-tests.
(Error bars show standard errors of the mean. Double stars represent signiﬁcant
differences at the .001 level.) Note, the group mean MAs used in the matching were
derived from the Core test results shown in Fig. 4, according to the BAS-II procedures.on the Speed of Processing task, where the OLA group showed superior
performance to the YHA group. This group difference on the Speed of
Processing task appears to sit at odds with the role of speed proposed
by Anderson, whereby speed is argued to be responsible for producing
variability within-ages, but not between-ages (Anderson, 1999). If the
Speed of Processing task reliably samples a speed mechanism such as
the one Anderson describes, then we would expect performance on
this task to be superior in the YHA group.
Experiment 2 showed that younger and older MA-matched groups
differed reliably on 2 sub-tests. On the other 8 sub-tests the groups
were no different in their performances. As in Experiment 1, and again
in contrast to Spitz, Experiment 2 revealed no advantage of verbal abil-
ities in the YHA group. For instance, YHA and OLA groups were not
different on Vocabulary, or Information. In contrast to Experiment 1,
however, in Experiment 2, it was the YHA who outperformed the OLA
on Coding; a task designed to tap speed of processing. This ﬁnding is
consistent with Anderson's speed of processing account. The OLA ad-
vantage over the YHA on Arithmetic was consistent with the results
Spitz reported, suggesting an advantage of age. In contrast to Spitz,
our results indicate thatMA-matched children of different chronological
ages are largely similar in their cognitive abilities.
While Experiments 1 & 2 appear to offer conﬂicting results with re-
gard to the sub-tests tapping speed of processing, we argue that (1) dif-
ferences in the relative contributions of these tests to IQ scores, and
(2) differences in the processes that the sub-tests measure, account
for these seemingly contradictory ﬁndings. Firstly, the respective sub-
tests used to tap speed, within the BAS II and WISC-III, do not appear
equivalent in their contributions to measures of intellectual ability.
That is, on the BAS II measures of overall ability are created using the
scores from the Core Scales. The Speed of Processing task (one of six
Diagnostic measures) is used to gain insight into a child's abilities on
the Core Scales, and so performance on this Diagnostic scale does not
contribute to resultant IQ scores. In contrast, the Coding sub-test on
the WISC-III does form a core measures, and consequently it is used to
generate overall IQ scores.
These differences indicate that in addition to tapping speed, the tests
may differ more critically in the cognitive processes they are sensitive
to. For instance, on the Speed of Processing sub-test on the BAS II, chil-
dren are tested for how quickly they can read and cross out the highest
number on each line of a page containing several lines of numbers.4 The
task is therefore heavily reliant on processing information relating
to number. Given greater experience with number concepts it seems
plausible that older children (i.e., who havemore familiarity with num-
ber concepts via schooling) would show an advantage. This is what our
results showed in Experiment 1. This argument alsoﬁtswith our ﬁnding
in Experiment 2 where the OLA outperformed the YHA on Arithmetic
(another sub-testwhere experiencewith number conceptswould likely
lend an advantage). Accordingly, these ﬁndings are consistent with
Spitz's view that superior performance of older less able children over
youngermore able children is, at least in part, inﬂuenced by experience.
On the WISC-III, the Coding sub-test used to assess Speed requires
that children use a key to copy information paired with different geo-
metric shapes, to a number of empty geometric shapes on a page.5 Be-
cause of the abstract nature of this task, it would seem reasonable to
expect more intelligent individuals to show an advantage on this task.
Indeed, the result from Experiment 2, where the YHA outperformed
the OLA is consistent with this view.
In attempting to understand the source of differences between
our ﬁndings and those reported by Spitz, it is important to consider a
number of possible limitations in the approach we took. Firstly, in
Experiment 1 the strategy for using a selective sampling procedure4 Speed of Processingperformance is assessed via the approximate time children take to
complete a page (e.g., 5 points for ﬁnishing between 0 and 10 s, and 4 points for 11–15 s).
5 Coding performance is assessed via the number of correct pairings children complete
within 120 s.
Fig. 6. Experiment 2: (a) Mean CAs and MAs in full sample of younger and older primary school groups. (Error bars show standard errors of the mean. Double stars represent signiﬁcant
differences at the .001 level.) (b) The actual MA–CA disparities in younger and older primary school groups. Data to the left of the dashed black vertical line (at point 0) represent children
with MAs lower than their CAs. Data to the right represent children with MAs higher than their CAs.
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obtaining our target groups of younger more able and older less able
children. However, our results showed this method was not fully reli-
able. Using teacher's assessments to select the top 5 younger children,
and the bottom5 older children in their respective classes, did not result
in younger children all with MAs greater than their CAs, and older
children all with MAs less than their CAs. In the full sample that we
tested, we found a number of younger children for whom their MAs
appeared equal to their CAs, and a number of older children with MAs
equal to, or above their CAs. These childrenwere therefore not included
in our comparisons of YHA and OLA groups. Consequently, in Experi-
ment 1 we obtained a relatively small sample size (N= 28) thus limit-
ing the generalizability of our ﬁndings (the computed power of
Experiment 1 is 0.39). Importantly, though, in Experiment 2 where we
achieved a larger sample (N = 61), and where we had adequate
power (the computed power in Experiment 2 is 0.72), we replicated
the pattern of highly similar cognitive proﬁles in MA-matched groupsFig. 7. Experiment 2: (a) Mean CAs andMAs for reduced set of primary school children. (Error
groups in reduced set of primary school children. Data to the left of the dashed vertical line (
children with MAs higher than their CA.of YHA and OLA children. On a separate note, it is an intriguing ﬁnding
that on the standardized intelligence test we used, 6 out of 20 older
children, who were believed to be of low ability, scored average or
above average in their ability. At the very least, this suggests that the
older children who were performing poorly at school were doing so
for reasons other than their cognitive ability. Future research is aimed
at examining the role social and emotional factors might play in
inﬂuencing academic outcomes for such children.
Experiment 2 revealed a different limitation, also related to the sam-
pling process we used. Speciﬁcally, this concerns a general problem in
MA-matching designs where in order to achieve groups of individuals
closely matched on MA, it is typically necessary to test a great many
more subjects than are used in the analysis. While the data collected
in Experiment 2 were obtained as part of a broader research program,
the cost (in terms of time and resources) can be considerable, and
thus these factors may play a signiﬁcant role in inﬂuencing ﬁnal sample
numbers.bars show standard errors of the mean) (b) Mean MA–CA disparities of younger and older
at point 0) represent children with MAs lower than their CA. Data to the right represent
Fig. 8. Experiment 2: Mean proportion correct on each of the ten WISC-III sub-tests for
MA-matched YHA and OLA primary school groups. See text for explanations of sub-
tests. (Error bars show standard errors of the mean. Double stars represent signiﬁcant
differences at the .001 level.)
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is that the spread of ages we tested was not as great compared to those
Spitz used. Although the samples we achieved were also YHA and OLA,
in our study the mean age differences in CAs between YHA and OLA
groups were 3.9 years and 1.9 years, in Experiments 1 & 2 respectively.
In Spitz's study the mean age difference between YHA and OLA groups
was 6.4 years. This highlights an important tension in replicating a
design whereby the aim is simultaneously to create a disparity in CA,
and eliminate any disparity in MA. The tension that arises is due to the
fact that as the disparity between CA increases, there is increased likeli-
hood that at the lower end of the spectrum the poorer abilities of the
older less able children are due to some formof developmental disorder.
Given the larger gap in ages between the samples that Spitz used, it is
possible that within his OLA group were children with developmental,
or learning disorders. Thus, the differences Spitz found in the cognitive
proﬁles of YHA and OLA children may be due to important differences
in the cognitive processes that underlie test performance in atypically
developing children, versus lower ability children at the low end of
the normal range.
A ﬁnal point of difference between our approach and that of Spitz's,
concerns the tests we used. Spitz compared the performance proﬁles of
YHA and OLA groups on the Stanford–Binet (Binet, 1916); the ﬁrst revi-
sion to Binet's early test items (1906). Our comparisons of YHA and OLA
groups used the BAS II and the WISC-III, each of which have proﬁted
from over 80 years of reﬁnement. Though over time all intelligence
tests may have drawn criticisms for their power to accurately assess
abilities, particularly relevant here is the possibility that the early
versions of the Stanford–Binet test were verbally loaded and that the
verbal instructions that accompanied several of the sub-tests may
have unfairly disadvantaged children with a poorer grasp of language
(see e.g., Becker, 2003).6 Under this view, such a limitation may have
favored the youngermore articulate children inMerrill's data anddisad-
vantaged the older ones. However, the test's verbal loading would not
account for the advantages that Spitz showed in the OLA. Herein lies
another potentially important difference between the Stanford–Binet
(Binet, 1916) and the tests we used. Whereas the Stanford–Binet test
(Binet, 1916) included items to tap age, or maturational effects (test
items such as tying shoes, counting change and correctly stating the
date), there do not seem to be equivalent tasks in the BAS II, or WISC-
III. Though the latter tests include sub-tests such as Recall of Designs6 Indeed, from Becker's analysis of the history of the Stanford-Binet test, the test
remained verbally loaded until its 6th revision in 1986 (Becker, 2003).(a drawing task in which motor control might be assumed to be more
advanced in older children), this task likely also involves some compo-
nent of frontal, executive control in planning the copy of that drawing
from memory. Taken together, the presence of a verbally loaded
Stanford–Binet (which may have advantaged Merrill's YHA group)
and lack of pure age or maturational tests in the BAS II and WISC-III,
may explain the differences between the results presented here and
those of Spitz.
Notwithstanding the limitations discussed, we believe that our re-
sults offer a rich source for new questions concerning the relationship
between cognition and intelligence to be examined. Overall, the results
of both experiments suggest a different view from that advanced by
Spitz. The data from the current study suggest that when closely
matched onmental age, the cognitive and intellectual abilities of groups
of children of different ages are largely similar. Whatever disadvantages
the OLA group experiences as a result of their lower abilities, these are
compensated for by their greater age; and conversely, whatever the
YHA group lacks by virtue of their lower age is compensated for by
their greater ability. These ﬁndings are critical as they suggest that little
discriminates differences in intelligence and cognitive development.
That is, in middle childhood, one's level of performancemay be reached
equally through either greater age and lower ability, or lower age and
greater ability.
With regard to the issue of viability of the multi-age classroom ap-
proach, the data presented here would support the view that children,
if matched closely on mental ability, are largely equivalent in their
thinking. Importantly, it is not clear from the current study whether
the cognitive proﬁles of the children we matched on mental ability
would continue to be similar over the course of development. Since cog-
nitive development is non-linear (i.e., it is protracted in early years and
it reaches an asymptote in adulthood), mental-age matching becomes
unviable later on. Therefore, it remains to be seen how the proﬁles of
younger higher ability and older lower ability individuals compare in
the teenage years, up until the point that MA-matching ceases to be
viable. Future research incorporating a longitudinal approach would
allow this question to be more fully answered.
In conclusion, and in answer to the central question raised in the
introduction, we argue that being more intelligent is like having more
development. The similarity observed in the proﬁles between YHA
and OLA groups strongly suggests that themechanisms that are respon-
sible for variability in intelligence and development are indeed the
same. Thus our study supports a more parsimonious uni-dimensional
perspective. The broader implication of this view is that it would
therefore be quite meaningless to study separately the mechanisms
underlying intelligence from those underlying development. The
challenge for future research lies in identifying precisely what the
mechanisms are and explaining how these are causally responsible for
the variability observed both within ages and between ages.
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